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Abstract  
Alternative approaches to environmental regulation have gained much attention in recent years. 
Information-based regulation is an increasingly popular type of instrument that refers to the use 
of ratings, rankings, labels, online inventories and similar public disclosure practices by 
regulators. Such schemes vary in their design, disclosure formats, mechanisms to influence 
behaviour and performance. Theoretical and practical questions remain about whether and how 
regulators can use voluntary and/or beyond compliance disclosures. The article develops a 
classification of information-based schemes based on whether the scheme is mandatory or 
voluntary, and whether the disclosures reveal compliance or beyond compliance performance 
behaviours. The classification is used to show how the different schemes (traditional, assurance, 
performance and proactive) work in practice with their associated risks, benefits and 
mechanisms. While regulators are experimenting with this new frontier of regulation, it is not yet 
clear whether all types of  schemes will be sufficiently robust to deliver on the promise they hold 
for enthusiasts of smart regulation. We conclude with implications and future research questions 
on the nature of voluntariness and compliance in information-based regulation.  
1. Introduction 
In many developed countries, government regulators have experienced pressure on their budgets 
and an ideological shift towards smarter, better and alternative regulation (Baldwin, 2010; Lodge 
and Wegrich, 2009; Sunstein, 2013). Reforms such as the Better Regulation agenda have 
challenged regulators to deliver ‘more for less’ by using new instruments to achieve their 
intended outcomes (Baldwin, 2010; Gouldson et al., 2009; Radaelli and Meuwese, 2009). These 
new instruments include a range of more effective, efficient and flexible alternatives to 
complement the more established command-and-control and economic approaches (Taylor et al., 
2012, 2015). 
 2 
Information-based regulation is often considered an effective alternative when information 
disclosure is used as a primary mechanism to stimulate behaviour change and drive more 
sustainable business practices (Fung et al., 2007; Tietenberg, 1998). Information-based 
regulation has been particularly relevant in the environmental domain – in seeking to address air 
pollution quality, reduce energy use,  improve bio-monitoring and assessment, and agricultural 
practice – in forms such as ratings, certification schemes, rankings, pollution inventories and 
other similar schemes based on releasing information to the public. The popularisation of 
information-based regulation in environmental regulation has its origins in the Toxic Release 
Inventory of the US Environmental Protection Agency and other Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers that were implemented from the 1980s (OECD, 2000). Due to the longevity and 
availability of data from Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers, studies have widely 
researched the effects, effectiveness and economic impacts of toxic release disclosures (e.g. 
Doshi et al., 2013; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Hamilton, 2005; Kim and Lyon, 2011). 
Traditionally, information-based regulation schemes such as the Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers  have required firms to disclose that they are complying with mandatory obligations by 
releasing specific information at specific times. Classic examples include publishing data on 
chemical releases or displaying safety or environmental permits. However, we can now observe 
a much wider variety of schemes that tap into more diverse disclosure formats and behavioural 
mechanisms. Schemes like the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Audit Policy offer firms 
reduced penalties and other incentives through voluntary self-disclosures of compliance (Short 
and Toffel, 2008). Other voluntary schemes facilitate collaboration with state regulators via 
trusted third-party certification stakeholders and can be used to inform regulatory decisions 
(Lange and Gouldson, 2010; Lim and Prakash, 2014). In some cases, information-based 
regulation schemes entail opportunities for firms to signal their better performance through 
disclosure beyond a basic legal compliance level (Santos et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2015; Wang 
et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, the nature of regulatory involvement in information-based regulation has been 
taking new forms beyond mandating disclosure and setting the information standards (Bowen 
and Panagiotopoulos, 2018a; Lange and Gouldson, 2010). Regulators are increasingly placing 
efforts on incentives and advanced forms of data release that can be more valuable than the act of 
disclosure itself (Bae et al., 2010; Esty, 2004). There are further opportunities for regulators to 
endorse or reward participation in private schemes in which they have no direct control, to 
delegate or even to more formally devolve regulatory or enforcement authority (e.g. Bartle and 
Vass, 2007; Bowen and Panagiotopoulos, 2018a; Upham et al., 2011). Regulators’ efforts to 
increase their involvement in information-based regulation approaches have also been enabled 
by data analytics, distribution platforms and open government data applications and formats 
(Pirog, 2014; Sayogo et al., 2014; Thaler and Tucker, 2013; Zuiderwijk and Janssen, 2014). 
While these developments are creating a new landscape in environmental regulation, researchers 
have not yet systematically examined the different types of information-based regulation 
schemes and the main mechanisms upon which they operate. This could become a significant 
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omission because evidence suggests that the effectiveness of these schemes – if they work at all 
– depend heavily on the credibility of their components, mechanisms of disclosure and the 
circumstances under which they are deployed (Taylor et al., 2019, 2015; Weil et al., 2006). This 
further becomes evident as the reach of information-based regulation schemes has been 
expanding to many different contexts and emerging economies like the Philippines, Indonesia 
and China (Jorge et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2013; Zeng et al., 2010). 
Given the ideological shift towards smarter, better and alternative regulation (Gouldson et al., 
2009; Lange and Gouldson, 2010) and particular rise in interest for information-based regulation 
(see Taylor et al 2015; Taylor et al 2019), we aim to contribute to our conceptual and practical 
understanding by developing a classification based on whether the scheme is mandatory or 
voluntary, and whether the performance standard disclosed is based on compliance or beyond 
compliance behaviours. Based on these main components, four different types are distinguished 
and presented using illustrative examples to show how they work in practice. This analytical 
framework offers an original conceptual organisation of information-based regulation schemes 
along the dimensions of compliance and voluntariness, emphasising how change mechanisms 
vary between scheme types and how this affects their stability and effectiveness. 
The classification highlights new frontiers in information-based regulation, where regulators use 
voluntary disclosed information or information indicating beyond compliance behaviours to 
regulate firms. It further shows the importance of transitions and design choices between the four 
types and mechanisms so that stakeholders can sufficiently interpret their impacts through 
gradual adaptation. The paper concludes by highlighting new theoretical questions and 
implications on the nature of voluntariness and compliance.  
2. A classification of information-based regulation  
Traditionally, information-based regulation schemes have been mandatory and compliance-based 
but innovative developments and trends in regulatory practice point to a potentially wider range 
in scheme design. A primary distinction is whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary. In 
mandatory schemes, information disclosure is required by statutory instruments, formal 
regulations or is automatically disclosed by the regulator. For example, in New Zealand and 
Australia, all genetically modified food and ingredients must be labelled as such (Fortin and 
Renton, 2003; Gruère et al., 2009), and in the USA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
requires mandatory disclosure of toxic chemical releases by industrial and federal facilities 
(Hamilton, 2005). In contrast, voluntary schemes offer optional disclosure of information in the 
scheme. For example, businesses may voluntarily disclose non-compliance incidents at their 
facilities in a compliance audit within the US EPA’s Audit Policy (Short and Toffel, 2008; 
Stafford, 2007) or voluntarily disclose that their environmental management system has been 
certified by third-party agencies such as the ISO.  
A second and less explored distinction relates to variations about the target performance standard 
expected of participating firms. Compliance in any given governance context is relative to norms 
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and compliance performance standards are negotiated as acceptable to the regulator and, 
indirectly, to other stakeholders (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Although regulatory agencies 
have traditionally concerned themselves with the non-compliance / compliance performance 
border, they are increasingly recognising that compliance is relative, and appreciating that certain 
firms can be performing at a level beyond that required by regulation or law (Paddock and 
Wentz, 2014). For example, firms may display environmental permits or chemical hazards labels 
to demonstrate that they are in compliance with the relevant regulation. Other information 
schemes such as the EU’s Energy Efficiency Labels for domestic appliances or Building 
Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) ratings for sustainable 
buildings may indicate that a firm’s performance is higher than the basic legal compliance bar 
and current regulatory enforcement norms (Greenwood et al., 2017; Waide et al., 1997). 
 
Figure 1: A classification of information-based regulation schemes based on the disclosure requirement 
and expected performance quality standard of a participating firm 
Figure 1 shows the new classification based on these two main distinctions. The columns 
represent the initial distinction of whether information disclosure is required – ‘mandatory’ or 
‘voluntary’ – and the rows represent the performance quality standard that the firm is disclosing 
about. The ‘compliance’ category indicates whether the information is about firm performance at 
a basic legal compliance standard, above which no further compliance enforcement activity is 
possible or required. The ‘beyond compliance’ category indicates that firm performance can be 
at an exemplary level that is higher, or sooner, than expected by basic regulatory compliance 
(Bowen and Panagiotopoulos, 2018a; Taylor et al., 2015). To illustrate the classification and 
elaborate on each type, we draw on current literature of relevant cases as summarised in Table 1 
and discussed in the following sections.
Assurance 
Disclosure optional, and 
demonstrate basic 
performance quality 
standard 
Performance 
Disclosure required, and 
can do more than basic 
performance quality 
standard 
Proactive 
Disclosure optional, and 
can do more than basic 
performance quality 
standard 
Traditional 
Disclosure required, and 
demonstrate basic 
performance quality 
standard 
VOLUNTARY MANDATORY 
BEYOND 
COMPLIANCE 
COMPLIANCE 
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Table 1: Illustrative information-based schemes used by regulators 
 Information-based 
scheme used by 
regulator (and country) 
Description Role(s) of 
regulator 
Disclosure 
requirement 
Performance 
level 
Illustrative 
references 
T
r
a
d
it
io
n
a
l 
Renewable Transport 
Fuels Obligation (UK) 
Requirement on transport fuel suppliers to 
disclose what percentage of all road 
vehicle fuel supplied is from sustainable 
renewable sources. 
Design; 
Monitor; 
Enforce 
Mandatory  Compliance Department for 
Transport 
(2017b, 2017a, 
2008) Chalmers and 
Archer (2011) 
Upham et al. (2011) 
National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting 
System (Australia) 
A single national framework for disclosing 
information about greenhouse gas 
emissions, energy production, energy 
consumption and other information 
specified under NGER legislation. 
Design; 
Monitor; 
Enforce 
Mandatory Compliance Lodhia and Martin 
(2012) Martinov-
Bennie and 
Hoffman (2012) 
Genetically Modified 
labels (Australia and 
New Zealand) 
Requires labelling of all genetically 
modified food and ingredients, apart from 
that prepared for immediate consumption 
(such as restaurant and takeaway food) and 
highly refined foods where the novel DNA 
or novel protein has been removed 
Design; 
Monitor; 
Enforce 
Mandatory Compliance Gruère et al. (2008) 
Gruère et al. (2009) 
Toxic Release Inventory 
Program (USA) 
Disclosure of toxic chemical releases and 
pollution prevention activities reported by 
industrial and federal facilities. 
Design; 
Information 
provision 
Mandatory  Compliance Marchi and 
Hamilton (2006) 
Freedman and 
Stagliano (2008)  
Hamilton (2005) 
A
ss
u
r
a
n
c
e 
Red Tractor (UK) A product and supply chain certification 
programme that discloses information 
about food safety and animal welfare 
issues in farming. 
Endorse Voluntary Compliance Richards et al. 
(2011)  
Hickman (2012)  
Assured Food 
Standards (2018) 
Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (USA) 
Requires the disclosure of information 
about nuclear power plant operations. 
Endorse Voluntary Compliance Graham et al. 
(2001) 
Rees (1994) 
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Environmental 
Protection Agency Audit 
Policy (USA) 
Firms voluntarily disclose non-compliance 
incidents to the EPA in return for 
regulatory relief and learning. 
Design Voluntary Non-
compliance 
Stafford (2007) 
Short and Toffel 
(2008)  
Toffel and Short 
(2011) 
Energy Star Product 
Label (USA) 
Symbol for energy efficiency. Endorse Voluntary Compliance Webber and Brown 
(2000) 
McWhinney et al. 
(2005) 
Boyd et al. (2008) 
P
e
r
fo
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
Energy Performance 
Certificate (UK) 
An information certificate that provides 
details on the energy performance of the 
property and what can be improved. 
Design; 
Information 
provision 
Mandatory Beyond 
compliance 
Watts et al. (2011)  
 
Energy Efficiency Labels 
for appliances (UK/EU) 
Information about a product’s energy 
efficiency. 
Design Mandatory Beyond 
compliance 
Waide et al. (1997)  
Heinzle and 
Wüstenhagen 
(2012) 
GreenWatch program 
(China) 
Rates environmental performance of firms 
from best to worst using five colours—
green, blue, yellow, red, and black—which 
represent excellent, good, fair, bad, and 
very bad, respectively.  
Design, 
Information 
provision 
Quasi-
mandatory 
Beyond 
compliance 
Wang et al. (2004) 
Liu et al. (2010a) 
Liu et al. (2010b) 
Nutrition labels 
(Various) 
Display of nutritional information on pre-
packaged foods. 
Design, 
Information 
provision 
Mandatory Beyond 
compliance 
Campos et al. 
(2011) 
P
r
o
a
c
ti
v
e
 
System Based 
Supervision of 
Compliance Assurance 
(Netherlands; Germany; 
UK) 
Environmental regulators accept disclosure 
of beyond compliance certified 
environmental management systems such 
as ISO 14001 as evidence of compliance 
assurance; e.g. EPR EMS+ trial by the 
Environment Agency in the UK 
Endorse; 
Accept 
third-party 
rating 
Voluntary Beyond 
compliance 
Environment 
Agency (2014)  
Glachant et al. 
(2002) 
 7 
Building Research 
Established 
Environmental 
Assessment Method 
(UK) 
Using disclosure of BRE’s assessments 
and ratings of the sustainability of 
buildings in planning and public 
procurement processes. 
Endorse; 
Accept 
third-party 
rating 
Voluntary Beyond 
compliance 
Fuerst and 
McAllister (2011) 
Kajikawa et al. 
(2011)  
Schweber (2013) 
Cole and 
Valdebenito (2013) 
Greenwood et al. 
(2017) 
Fuerst et al. (2011) 
 
Integrated Environmental 
Policy Instruments 
Scheme (Portugal) 
Regulatory use of sustainable production 
labels that indicate better environmental 
management practices. 
Endorse; 
Information 
provision 
Voluntary Beyond 
compliance 
Santos et al. (2006) 
 Forest Stewardship 
Council Certificate (UK) 
FSC certificate can be used in place of UK 
Woodland Assurance Statement to meet 
the Timber Procurement Policy. 
Endorse; 
Accept 
third-party 
assurance 
Voluntary Beyond 
Compliance 
Defra (2013) 
Brack (2014) 
Auld and Bull 
(2003) 
Auld and 
Gulbrandsen (2014) 
Moog et al. (2015) 
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2.1. Traditional schemes  
Traditional schemes (lower left quadrant in Figure 1) require organizations to disclose a specific 
set of information in a standardised format. Participating firms have little flexibility with what 
information they disclose and how, and as such do not have opportunities to go beyond 
compliance. For example, under the UK’s Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) carbon 
and sustainability reporting system certain fuel suppliers must submit (independently verified) 
monthly reports on their net GHG savings and the sustainability of their biofuels in accordance 
with the Department for Transport’s guidelines (Chalmers and Archer, 2011; Upham et al., 
2011). Similarly, the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS) in Australia 
requires companies that exceeded a pre-determined corporate group threshold to audit and report 
their annual GHG emissions, energy consumption and production. Failure to comply with either 
scheme may result in financial penalties. In the case of RTFO, a civil penalty may be issued to a 
supplier if they do not apply for an RTFO account or they fail to redeem enough Renewable 
Transport Fuel Certificates or buy-out their obligation (Department for Transport, 2017b).  
Under the NGER Act failure to meet registration requirements, reporting requirements, record-
keeping requirements or auditing requirements led to a civil penalty. 
Evaluation studies show that in response to the RTFO, fuel suppliers improved disclosure 
consistency and quality, as well as availability of reliable data (Chalmers and Archer, 2011). 
Mandatory reporting and the regular publication of fuel suppliers’ performance compared to 
targets generated enough internal industry pressure for obligated firms to improve reporting and 
performance. The reputational risks associated with failing to meet compliance standards could 
affect a fuel supplier’s licence to operate, which in turn will affect their financial performance. 
By reporting correctly and in line with what is legally expected, firms can mitigate any potential 
reputational risks.  
Likewise, revealing toxic chemical releases through online inventories provides confidence 
internally and externally that a firm is meeting its regulatory obligations (Hamilton, 2005). In 
addition to improving the reporting standards of regulated companies, traditional schemes are a 
useful tool for helping reporting firms to understand their business better. For instance, NGERS 
led to some firms developing a new understanding about where energy is being used in their 
operations due to the systematic auditing process they had to perform in order to meet 
compliance (Martinov-Bennie and Hoffman, 2012). In this sense, firms ‘learn through doing’, 
whereby having to disclose information leads firms to reassess their practice and identify 
previously unforeseen or unknown risks and opportunities. Yet, paradoxically, analysis of 
NGERS also indicated that, while firms may know their operations better, the additional costs 
and responsibility of reporting, particularly the cost of producing and assuring the data to meet 
the regulatory requirements, prevented action (Martinov-Bennie and Hoffman, 2012) and 
represented a compliance risk to small and medium-size firms that may only have limited 
resources (Lodhia and Martin, 2012). 
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Despite potentially improving reporting standards and internal awareness of environmental 
issues, traditional schemes do not appear to transform organisational behaviour and practice. Due 
to the narrow focus and relative rigidity of such schemes, the ability to affect change over time 
may diminish when participating entities lack opportunities or incentives to innovate beyond the 
required level. In the case of the RTFO, the UK Department for Transport’s (2017a) impact 
analysis indicated that after an initial high rate of GHG emission reductions caused by 
incentivising participating firms to switch from crop-based to waste-based feedstocks (which 
have a higher net GHG savings), the rate of reduction plateaued. In addition, critics of the RTFO 
highlighted potential unintended social and environmental consequences due to limitations in the 
scheme’s remit. Depending on which biofuels participating firms used, GHG emission 
reductions, energy security improvements, and benefits to local economies may be negated. 
Increases in the manufacturing of biofuels also affect biodiversity due to land-use change, as 
well as increase demand for feedstocks could inflate the cost of staple foods (e.g., corn, wheat) 
(Boucher, 2012; Palmer, 2010; Patterson et al., 2011).  
To address such shortcomings, it has been suggested that stakeholders other than the regulator 
should be engaged to encourage continued change. For example, mandatory GM labelling in 
Australia/New Zealand provided a reason for processors and retailers to avoid using GM 
ingredients  (Gruère et al., 2009) and for consumers to avoid buying GM products (Fortin and 
Renton, 2003). The lack of flexibility of traditional schemes also provides incentives for firms to 
engage in regulatory capture by attempting to shape the regulation in their favour (Levine and 
Forrence, 1990).  
For these reasons, traditional schemes reinforce behavioural norms as firms seek to improve their 
performance to match industry standards or seek cost efficiencies, maintain both their legal and 
social licence to operate, as well as legitimise industry norms. The downside of such an 
organisational response is that traditional schemes are susceptible to greenwashing or superficial 
behaviour amongst firms as they seek to differentiate themselves from their competitors or, even 
more disconcerting, firms may also generate more favourable figures for reporting to avoid 
negative consequences. For instance, “negative stock market reactions to Toxic Release 
Inventory information lead to a reduction in the release of toxics onsite but increased the waste 
shipped offsite” (Marchi and Hamilton, 2006, p. 58).  
2.2. Assurance schemes 
In assurance schemes (lower right quadrant in Figure 1) firms voluntarily disclose whether they 
are meeting basic legal standards in their operations, often through a label or other industry-led 
stamp of approval. While the underlying behaviour of meeting a basic legal compliance level is 
mandatory, communicating about it through disclosure is an additional voluntary step that some 
firms decide to undertake to provide additional stakeholder assurance.  
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In many cases, assurance schemes emerge in the wake of high-profile corporate failures. For 
example, the Red Tractor in the UK is a food assurance scheme that aims to improve trust in UK 
food production in response to food scares. The scheme relies on credible third-party 
involvement to endorse products against a number of good agricultural practices and animal 
welfare standards (Assured Food Standards, 2018; Northen, 2001; Richards et al., 2011). After 
initially being developed by the industry, the UK Department for the Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) amplified Red Tractor’s uptake by using it as a signal of compliance with 
basic farming practice that can provide regulatory relief, insofar that Red Tractor farms are less 
likely to receive compliance inspections (Assured Food Standards, 2018). A similar example is 
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) self-regulatory assurance scheme created by 
industry and endorsed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to address previous 
performance and safety failings (Rees, 1994; Rust and Rothwell, 1995; Taylor and Wolak, 
2011). Member utilities voluntarily disseminate information on nuclear plant performance and 
management practices, as well as undergo regular on-site plant evaluations to demonstrate safety 
and reliability in operations.  
In addition to potential regulatory relief, assurance schemes can facilitate opportunities for 
internal learning.  Toffel and Short (2011) find that firms improved both their regulatory 
compliance and environmental performance when they voluntarily disclosed regulatory 
violations under the EPA’s Audit Policy. This was based on an analysis of 19,986 facilities 
within the period of 1991-2003 where 688 facilities voluntarily disclosed violations with only 
30% of them doing so more than once in subsequent years. The key change mechanism was 
internal learning by participating firms rather than an external driver from customers or other 
stakeholders. Likewise, research shows that firms participating in Red Tractor improved their 
understanding and management of food assurance issues in their field operations (Garcia, 2007; 
Richards et al., 2011), whilst INPO member utilities benefitted from each other’s operational 
experience that was facilitated by the sharing and acting on the lessons learned (INPO, 2007). 
Despite these seemingly special characteristics of assurance schemes, compliance with standards 
may come with little market differentiation. Whilst early adopters of Red Tractor were rewarded 
with market differentiation since they were amongst the first to voluntarily engage in additional 
assurance disclosure, this competitive advantage faded over time with Red Tractor becoming a 
standard practice. By 2017, 78,000 farmers across the UK had been awarded the Red Tractor 
standard (Assured Food Standards 2018).  Red Tractor endorsement no longer represents a 
competitive advantage that allows for a premium price to producers for quality produce (Kirk-
Wilson, 2002), instead Red Tractor ensures market access to major food retail chains (Garcia, 
2007; Richards et al., 2011) by guaranteeing that “food is British and legal, but little else” 
(Hickman, 2012). There is also some apprehension about significant costs of participating, with 
farmers indicating the increased administration work associated with the scheme, and the annual 
inspection costs and preparatory activities involved (Garcia, 2007).  
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Assurance schemes may also lead to an audit culture amongst participating firms that end up 
focusing on mitigating risk and the downsides of not participating, rather than taking 
opportunities offered by schemes to learn and improve. Under such intentions participation in 
assurance schemes like Red Tractor, for example, become strategic for food producers, insofar 
voluntary compliance (participation) can instil confidence in customers about the quality of food 
without much investigation. Richards et al. (2011, p. 34) call this phenomenon “trust 
manufacturing”, when trust is “identified, commoditized and sold alongside other product 
characteristics”. 
The degree of internal learning facilitated by assurance schemes, particularly the sharing of 
knowledge, is likely to be affected by industry characteristics such as the competitive nature of 
an industry. One of reasons behind the apparent success of INPO in improving knowledge 
exchange across the nuclear industry was the lack of competition between facilities (INPO, 
2007). In the Audit Policy assurance scheme, studies have noted the tendency by firms to 
disclose minor infractions only when faced with higher probability of inspection (Stafford, 2007) 
or only after regulators had already committed resources to inspect and prosecute them (Short 
and Toffel, 2008). Thus, Short and Toffel (2008) conclude that the policy appears to be most 
effective when it operates ‘in the shadow of the regulator’. Indeed, Gunningham and Sinclair 
(2017) note that the INPO turned to the government regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, after initial frustrations in its inability to work effectively in isolation. Internal 
learning may be a more powerful mechanism in ‘sin industries’ (e.g., nuclear power, mining, 
tobacco) that are more sensitive to the perception of external stakeholders in maintaining a social 
licence to operate, and are thus often more conscious about their outlook as they are collectively 
as strong as the weakest performer (King et al., 2011).  
2.3. Performance schemes 
In performance schemes (upper left quadrant of Figure 1) firms are required to participate yet the 
form of disclosure can indicate firm behaviours beyond that required by legal compliance. 
Typically, performance disclosure schemes reveal an ordinal score or performance on an interval 
scale, rather than the dichotomous disclosure of assurance schemes. For example, Energy 
Performance Certificates (EPC) in the EU provide information about buildings’ energy 
performance – rating energy efficiency and environmental (CO2) impact on a scale from A to G. 
All buildings at construction, sale or rent are required to have an EPC to inform potential buyers 
or occupiers and hence aim to indirectly influence consumer choice and suppliers’ production 
outputs. The intention is that “increased transparency will cause a structural shift towards higher 
demand for energy-efficient buildings which in turn effects prices, supply and GHG emission 
reductions” (Fuerst and McAllister, 2011, p. 6608).  
China’s GreenWatch program is another example of an information scoring system that grades a 
company’s environmental performance against state-defined benchmarks and then makes results 
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publicly available. The public disclosure of performance scores aims to stimulate change in 
polluters behaviour by removing information asymmetries between polluters and groups such as 
consumers and citizens (Wang et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2010a; 2010b; Liu et al., 2012). In 
performance schemes, behaviour change is driven through the social and consumer pressure of 
making current performance highly visible and thus influencing consumer awareness and choice. 
This might provide a strong incentive for firms to respond by striving for a high score (Bowen 
and Panagiotopoulos, 2018a). For example, GreenWatch encouraged firms to improve or deter 
poor environmental performance in response to increased pressures imposed by different 
stakeholders (Liu et al., 2010a; 2010b; Liu et al., 2012). Similarly, the EU Energy Labelling 
Scheme for appliances led to improvements in performance standards in appliances of German 
firms as they sought to address market share decline (Waide et al., 1997). The benefits contribute 
to Germany’s (and other European Union member country’s) portfolio of energy-efficient 
policies to reduce electricity demand (Wiel and McMahon, 2005). As Heinzle and Wüstenhagen 
(2012) note, energy efficiency labels help manufacturers to gain competitive advantages by 
signalling the relative environmental friendliness of their products. 
However, evidence on the operation of performance schemes is not strong. In a 2010 survey of 
347 house owners in Southampton (UK), EPCs were seen as useful, but not influential on the 
decision making process, and had a negligible impact on sale price and price negotiation (Watts 
et al., 2011). Other shortcomings in the implementation of the scheme include low participation 
rates and providing certificates after the marketing stage or upon sale/rental agreement. Whether 
intentional or not, Fuerst and McAllister (2011, p. 6609) note “this may be indicative of the 
importance that tenants place on this information rather than any attempt to obfuscate by 
owners”. Ultimately, the ability of performance schemes to affect change relies on an engaged 
audience of information users. 
Studies of other performance schemes have highlighted the importance of the specifics of 
information disclosure. In the case of nutrition labels, consumers often report difficulty in 
interpreting quantitative information contained in labels, and misleading serving sizes and health 
claims (Campos et al., 2011), the impacts of which made it difficult for consumers to compare 
products. Therefore, unless the guidelines for reporting are clearly established and 
communicated to the target audience, a scheme’s potential to change behaviour is limited. This 
critical factor might be more prevalent when the evaluation of performance relies on a well-
trained group of inspectors that have to assess firms consistently. 
Furthermore, as experienced in the case of the EU’s Energy Labelling Scheme, performance 
schemes can reach a point of inertia in stimulating change amongst participating firms. As 
Heinzle and Wüstenhagen (2012, p.61) note “while the original idea was to only have the best 
products marked with an A rating, this highest energy efficiency class has become a de facto 
standard in many product categories, to an extent where up to 90% of products such as 
refrigerators, dishwashers and washing machines on the European market are now A‐labelled 
(European Commission, 2010)”.  The problem of limited influence required the scheme’s criteria 
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to evolve over time by extending its rating class to A*** by 2010 (Heinzle and Wüstenhagen, 
2012). In a study of cold appliances in Denmark, the change to the schemes interval scale 
ranking “increased sales of high-efficiency appliances by 55%, at the announcement, and by a 
further 42% when implemented”  (Bjerregaard and Møller, 2019, p.891).Yet, “the effectiveness 
of a well‐established energy labelling scheme can actually be diminished by the introduction of 
new rating categories” (Heinzle and Wüstenhagen, 2012, p.68). Despite appliances becoming 
more energy efficient, the shift towards an ‘A’ grade, unintentionally distorted the scheme’s 
interval scale ranking. Appliance makers began to increasingly object to grade awards of ‘C’ 
because it had become synonymous with a failing grade and consumers thought they were 
buying A* class appliances, which however represented only average energy efficiency (Industry 
Europe, 2019); eventually the labelling scale will revert back to A to G and existing labels will 
be rescaled to reset the scheme’s impact. 
2.4. Proactive schemes 
Proactive schemes (upper right quadrant of Figure 1) have a voluntary disclosure requirement 
and target performance at a level beyond basic compliance. This type of scheme is less 
established, with several countries implementing experimental pilots (Glachant et al., 2002). 
Proactive schemes operate like standards, insofar they establish formal rules designed to play a 
coordinating function (Botzem and Dobusch, 2012) through the specification of voluntary ‘best 
practice’ rules that rely on third-party pressure (Brunsson et al., 2012). 
For example, in 2012-13, the Environment Agency in the UK piloted the Environmental 
Permitting Regulations’ Assurance Scheme (EPR EMS+) which aimed to lighten the burden of 
regulatory compliance on industrial facilities by taking account of environmental management 
systems already in place (Environment Agency, 2014). By linking regulatory compliance with 
certified environmental management systems such as the ISO 14001, firms and regulators could 
benefit from fewer inspections, lower compliance fees, less pressure on staff resources and 
generally less bureaucracy. Industrial facilities that complied were allowed to submit a light-
touch Annual Compliance Statement signed by the CEO (or equivalent) confirming the 
environmental performance and compliance is led at the highest level (Bowen and 
Panagiotopoulos, 2018b). 
Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) Certificate is another example where third-party assurance 
is accepted instead of the normal procedure to meet compliance (i.e., attain UK Woodland 
Assurance Statement) with the UK’s Timber Procurement Policy (Brack, 2014; Defra, 2013). 
Similarly, BREEAM owned by a non-state organisation and indirectly supported by the UK 
government, assesses, rates, and certifies the sustainability of a building’s construction 
(Kajikawa et al., 2011; Schweber, 2013). Certification provides a framework that construction 
firms can follow to indicate their voluntary beyond compliance performance in sustainable 
construction.  
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The lack of longitudinal evaluations of proactive schemes limits the strength of conclusions 
about how they work in practice. The EPR EMS+ trial did not result in overall lower average site 
compliance compared to the preceding two years or an increase in substantiated complaints 
(Environment Agency, 2014). There was also an overall net reduction in the time that inspectors 
spent on audit and advice under the EPR EMS+ by approximately 2-3 hours per site. However, 
despite reducing the burden for regulators, firms participating in the EPR EMS+ were unable to 
clearly identify a reduction of administrative burden although it was widely stated that 
familiarity under a full scheme could improve this. Firms that took part tended to have a good 
prior compliance levels, suggesting that this scheme is less appropriate for poorly performing 
firms, which are unlikely to voluntarily participate and go beyond the required or acceptable 
level of performance (Bowen and Panagiotopoulos, 2018b). 
In the case of BREEAM, it has been suggested “that the system successfully alerts building 
owners and professionals to the importance of environmental issues in construction” (Crawley 
and Aho, 1999 cited in Kajikawa et al., 2011, p.237), and allows comparison and benchmarking 
of different buildings. However, commentators have highlighted that the specific and complex 
certification criteria requires expertise that can cause “the cost of compliance to be high” 
(Kajikawa et al., 2011, p.237). Tensions exist between financial and sustainability requirements 
of construction projects, as well as between professionals’ own understanding of sustainability 
and BREEAM’s criteria, the result of which undermines respect for the scheme (Schweber, 
2013).  
Nevertheless, BREEAM is increasingly becoming a condition for planning permission for 
publicly funded non-residential building (Schweber, 2013). Thus, although not a mandatory 
scheme for large segments of the construction industry, firms involved in publicly funded 
buildings and with sustainability-oriented clients have had to accept the overlay of a BREEAM 
assessment process.  As more and more institutions and authorities make the attainment of a 
voluntary environmental label a required performance standard, proactive schemes such as 
BREEAM are becoming quasi-compulsory as the distinction between voluntary and mandatory 
becomes blurred (Cole and Jose Valdebenito, 2013; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011; Schweber, 
2013).  
Finally, there are potential issues around consistency in the skills and experience of third party 
auditors and certification bodies and the frequency of inspection, which could affect 
appropriateness of proactive schemes. In the case of the FSC (Auld and Bull, 2003), a global 
cross-sectoral forest management certification system that includes some state involvement, 
concerns have been raised about the legitimacy and credibility of the scheme, particularly 
regarding the operation of certifiers and the accreditation and auditing practices (Auld and 
Gulbrandsen, 2014; Moog et al., 2015). The result of this has seen prominent NGOs resign 
support for the FSC, with some forming a web-based watchdog (FSC-watch) to document 
instances of malpractice and misuse (Moog et al., 2015). This highlights an important dimension 
about the instability of proactive schemes and need for continuous evolution. 
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3. Discussion and implications 
So far, we have identified four distinctive types of information-based regulation schemes and 
compared them based on their underlying mechanisms, opportunities and challenges as 
summarised in Figure 2. Here we elaborate on the theoretical, practice and policy implications of 
the classification, focusing on the underlying change mechanisms in information-based 
regulation schemes and on the nature of voluntariness and compliance. 
 
Figure 2: Change mechanisms, opportunities and challenges of information-based regulation schemes 
3.1. Change mechanisms in information-based regulation   
Altogether, information-based regulation schemes are theorised in the governance literature to 
operate through three mechanisms: performance comparison, internal learning and earned 
recognition. While research recognises the potential of each of these mechanisms, the 
classification demonstrates that each mechanism is likely to be more influential in different types 
of information-based regulation. Fung et al. (2007) recognise that information-based regulation 
can improve performance quality standards through naming and shaming, and can also reduce 
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risks to the public through transparency and internal learning. Similarly, Lee (2010) highlights 
the difference between a direct effect of internal learning and an indirect effect of stakeholders 
(such as capital markets and NGOs) using public information disclosure. The examples 
presented in the article suggest that performance comparison, internal learning, and the least 
explored mechanism - earned recognition - are each more likely to occur in different types of 
information-based regulation. 
The performance comparison driver is more powerful in mandatory and beyond compliance 
schemes. A key feature of beyond compliance schemes is that the performance level is graded in 
some way, and presented in a standardised format to facilitate comparison. This taps into a 
naming and shaming dynamic, and encourages performance improvements by firms so as not to 
be evaluated by stakeholders, including regulators, as the worst performers. However, the 
mandatory nature of performance schemes can also increase the level of attention paid by firms 
to scoring well in less productive ways, such as gaming emissions so that facilities perform at 
their best at the time of the test. Although performance schemes that operate through social 
comparison are the most empirically studied type of information-based regulation, future 
research can continue to explore when and why performance comparison actually changes the 
behaviour of regulated firms.   
In contrast, assurance schemes aim to establish public confidence through voluntary disclosure 
that firms are meeting a compliance standard. These schemes rely on self-improvement through 
internal learning within the firms. Voluntary, industry-led assurance schemes often begin when 
there is uncertainty about the social or environmental issues firms face and how to deal with 
them (Bowen, 2017). Assurance schemes require internal audits and self-policing on whether the 
firm’s facilities are meeting a compliance level, hence encouraging internal focus. At their best, 
assurance schemes facilitate the transfer of good practice, and increase communication and 
information sharing between members through direct contact (King and Lenox, 2000). They can 
also lead to the development of a community of auditors and consultants who help spread 
credible information from one firm to another (Jahn et al., 2005). In the US EPA’s Audit 
Scheme, the most engaged stakeholders can be the legal community seeking to understand the 
implications of voluntarily disclosing (non)compliance performance, rather than the end 
consumers or the public. Thus future research might explore the extent to which learning in 
assurance schemes is directed at the scheme’s rules rather than the underlying environmental 
issues at hand. 
Proactive disclosure schemes attempt to leverage earned recognition, which is the most 
ambitious but also most difficult and possibly controversial mechanism to implement. These 
schemes are the purest form of taking elements from industry self-regulation – voluntary and 
beyond compliance disclosure schemes – and using them for regulatory purposes. In a form of 
risk-based regulation in proactive disclosure schemes (Gouldson et al., 2009; Hood et al., 2001), 
regulators evaluate the environmental performance of a firm based past or current environmental 
disclosures. Firms with evidenced beyond compliance performance such as an environmental 
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management system, earn recognition and receive regulatory relief. While earned recognition in 
proactive disclosure schemes is the most innovative frontier in information-based regulation, it is 
also the mechanism that is the least explored in the literature.  
3.2. Nature of voluntariness and compliance in information-based regulation  
Our analysis highlights questions on the theoretical nature of voluntariness and compliance. We 
distinguished whether a scheme is voluntary or not from the perspective of the regulator, and 
considered disclosures that were used by the regulator but are not necessarily legally mandated. 
However, the illustrative cases suggest that voluntariness may be less clear-cut than is usually 
supposed, and that voluntariness may differ in the eyes of different stakeholders, which has 
implications for regulatory efficacy (Hsueh, 2013). An information-based regulation scheme may 
not be required by law but can be effectively required by stakeholders such as consumers, supply 
chain partners, industry associations, media or NGOs to maintain a firm’s ‘licence to operate’. 
Once a private logo, code of conduct or reporting practice becomes institutionalised, it 
effectively becomes mandatory in practice even if it’s technically voluntary from the perspective 
of the regulator. In the case of Red Tractor, for example, since most large UK supermarkets will 
only purchase Red Tractor assured farm products, the scheme is effectively a pre-requisite for 
market access. 
Indeed, using voluntary, industry-led schemes as a proxy for regulatory assurance has been 
criticised in the broader regulation literature. Bartley (2007), for example, shows how the US 
apparel industry succeeded in replacing a discourse of legal compliance with one based on 
compliance to voluntary industry codes in response to rising stakeholder concerns about 
sweatshop labour. This enabled firms to maintain control over compliance through participating 
in the Fair Labor Association (FLA) to certify labour standards. Heinzle and Wüstenhagen 
(2012) argue that industry involvement in the evolution of the mandatory EU Energy Efficiency 
Labels scheme reduced the scheme’s effectiveness.  
We also find that some ‘quasi-mandatory’ schemes have both voluntary and mandatory 
elements. For example, the Building Research Establishment’s (BRE) Code for Sustainable 
Homes is mandatory for new build social housing in the UK, but a voluntary option for local 
authorities and private developers setting standards for private market housing (Greenwood et 
al., 2017). Other schemes shift between being mandatory and voluntary over time, as for 
example BREEAM in Wales, which was initially voluntary, then required and then withdrawn as 
a mandatory element of planning applications in 2014 as part of a simplification exercise.  
Compliance performance standards in some cases appear to be specific to space and time. 
Previous research has recognised that compliance is relative to norms in any given context 
(Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Thus, information-based regulation schemes can be evaluated 
relative to compliance differently in different geographical areas. For example, Red Tractor is 
effectively used as a compliance-level logo in the UK, but is perceived as a beyond compliance 
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differentiator in international markets (Richards et al., 2011). The US EPA Audit Policy scheme 
is a national public CSR disclosure scheme, but the performance level required to meet a 
compliance bar varies by state as negotiated by regulated firms, their lawyers and state-level 
regulators (Short and Toffel, 2008). Similarly, compliance performance may vary over time 
when: 1) schemes that were once differentiators can become a business-as-usual norm or 2) 
when expectations about compliance increase over time and what is still labelled as 'voluntary' is 
in fact anticipated from firms. For example, the UK’s second-largest supermarket chain, 
Sainsbury’s announced in 2012 that although it would continue to use Assured Food Standards 
schemes to manage supply chain integrity with its UK suppliers, it would be dropping the Red 
Tractor logo from packaging. As Sainsbury’s CEO explained: “Red Tractor doesn’t differentiate 
us… why would we lend credibility to a label that anyone can use?” (McEwan, 2014). This same 
dynamic was observed in the EU Energy Efficiency label for domestic appliances, which 
extended its rating class to A*** because 90% of appliances were labelled as ‘A’ by 2010 
(Heinze and Wüstenhagen, 2012).  
Conceptualised together, the fluidity of voluntariness and compliance pose serious questions for 
future research and practice of information-based regulation. Proactive schemes that use beyond 
compliance, voluntary disclosures for regulatory purposes seemed particularly unstable. 
Regulatory involvement in proactive schemes made them either more mandatory or more 
compliance-oriented over time. While regulators are experimenting with this new frontier of 
regulation, it is not yet clear whether this type of scheme will be sufficiently robust to deliver on 
the promise they hold for enthusiasts of smarter, better and more flexible regulation. 
3.3. Policy implications 
Overall, the analysis highlights the significant role of the institutional, spatial and historical 
environment in which firms are operating in determining the effectiveness of information-based 
regulation schemes. With variations in a firm’s stakeholders, performance expectations and 
challenges at hand, motivations for engaging with a particular issue via an information-based 
regulation scheme might vary significantly. Information-based regulation schemes are less likely 
to be prioritised the higher they are perceived on the scales of voluntariness and beyond 
compliance. Schemes might have better potential to become institutionalised via a process of 
evolution – from traditional to assurance or performance and then to proactive – to allow 
stakeholders and the institutional environment to develop the necessary understanding. Once a 
scheme becomes sufficiently interpreted within the industry, regulators can consider moving 
within the design options and change mechanisms that information-based regulation schemes can 
offer. This process can take place in line with assessments about cost-effectiveness, regulatory 
burden and the salience of the issue to push firms towards more socially and ethically 
responsible environmental behaviour. Therefore, for policy makers and regulators, a gradual 
implementation plan for information-based regulation schemes can be considered as the most 
suitable way to manage risk transitions and place such schemes within the range of acceptable 
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instruments (Gouldson et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2019) instead being perceived as suitable 
alternatives only in low to medium risk policy contexts (Uchida, 2007). 
Further to the challenges of implementation planning, there are attention limitations that  
information-based regulation schemes entail when they are perceived as a legitimate low barrier 
option within an increasingly connected information environment (Taylor et al., 2019). While 
multiple regulatory obligations on firms continuously result in new rankings, reviews and scores, 
attention by firms and information users still remains limited. For information-based regulation 
schemes to gain sufficient importance, regulators might have to reconsider the boundaries of 
their own functions beyond setting the framework and releasing data. Following the necessary 
design choices in non-traditional schemes, regulatory involvement is likely to require capacity to 
perform complementary functions such as delegating, endorsing or assuring information by 
others, and smart data management to stimulate further value creation from information-based 
regulation -related data (e.g. visualisation tools, application programming interfaces for wider 
distribution, better insight using analytics) (Bae et al., 2010; Bowen and Panagiotopoulos, 2018a; 
Esty, 2004). These activities exemplify the call for regulators to become smarter in their public 
use of data and information disclosure as an alternative instrument in environmental policy 
(Gunningham et al., 1998). 
4. Conclusion 
The paper presented a classification of information-based regulation based on whether the 
scheme is mandatory or voluntary, and whether the disclosures reveal compliance or beyond 
compliance performance behaviours. This conceptual organisation of information-based schemes 
on the basis of voluntariness and compliance provides a new point of reference to the existing 
literature instead of comparing schemes individually. The classification demonstrates how 
different schemes work in practice with their associated risks, benefits and mechanisms, which 
ultimately impact on the operation of the scheme. Furthermore, our analytic review emphasises 
how change mechanisms vary between scheme types and how this affects their stability and 
effectiveness, which is often not a clear distinction when information-based schemes are 
presented in the environmental regulation literature.  
A limitation to these conclusions is reliance on secondary sources to assess information 
disclosure and behaviour change, and the current strength of evidence available in the literature 
on the cases. Caution is warranted in generalising these insights because of the relatively recent 
implementation of many of these schemes and thus lack rich and detailed empirical evaluation. 
As such, the classification requires further examination with more schemes in action helping to 
establish whether and to what extent our initial findings are generalisable. In particular, it would 
be important to systematically and empirically test the assumption that dichotomous, voluntary 
assurance schemes are driven by internal learning, whereas scaled performance schemes are 
driven by external social pressure. Furthermore, the robustness of each of the types of schemes 
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could be evaluated separately with particular questions remaining about the sustainability of 
proactive schemes. 
As a final point of departure for future research, while the classification is useful to map the 
range and operation of schemes in a particular jurisdiction at a specific point in time, the slippery 
nature of voluntariness and compliance should be explored further. For example, future research 
could examine interactions between voluntary and mandatory disclosure requirements in 
contemporary regulation, and the extent to which these complement or substitute each other over 
time (e.g. Locke et al., 2013). Similarly, there are unanswered questions about interpretations of 
compliance in performance and proactive schemes, and the conditions under which achieving 
certain levels of compliance is actually seen as beneficial by the regulated entities.  
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